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Abstract: This paper identifies the legal and economic assessments 
applied to resolve WTO disputes requiring an assessment of the 
contribution of the measure to the objective pursued, along with 
identifying any reasonably available alternatives. It focuses on disputes 
encompassing an interpretation of GATT Article XX (b), Sanitary and 
PhytoSanitary Agreement (SPS) Article 5.6 and the Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT) Agreement Article 2.2. This narrow focus is because the WTO 
DSB has opined that there are no significant differences between the 
tests developed under Art. XX(b) of the GATT 1994 and Art. 5.6 of the SPS 
Agreement, nor that any aspect of the Art. XX(b) jurisprudence relating 
to the interpretation of the term "necessary" would be inapplicable to 
Art. 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. This provides an opportunity to compare 
the legal and economic assessments applied in disputes falling under 
these provisions. 
 
This paper identifies no significant differences between the legal tests 
relating to the interpretation of the term "necessary". A WTO Panel is 
under no obligation to quantify the measure's contribution to the 
objective pursued and 'a risk may be evaluated either in quantitative or 
qualitative terms'. However, the same cannot be said for the economic 
assessments determining whether the necessity of the contribution of the 
contested measure.  
 
After setting out the legal tests, the paper identifies those economic 
assessments undertaken to resolve disputes involving these three 
different GATT/WTO provisions. The paper finds that quantitative economic 
models are rarely employed in WTO dispute cases. The lack of coherent 
guidelines for assessing the economic dimensions of a dispute in a 
transparent and robust manner potentially undermines the effectiveness 
and the reputation of WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) recommendations. 
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1. Comparing legal and economic approaches
This paper compares the available jurisprudence of the ne-
cessity test, under both GATT XX(b), the SPS Agreement Ar-
ticle 5.6 and the TBT Agreement Article 2.2. This compara-
tive approach is taken in order to highlight the variations in the
economic analysis of trade disputes despite similar legal assess-
ments. All three of the GATT/WTO provisions discussed in this
article address the trade restrictiveness of a contested measure
and the findings of various Panels and Appellate Bodies (AB)
have supported a similar approach towards these different pro-
visions. The Panel in EC-Asbestos concluded that Art. 2.2 of
the TBT Agreement should not be given a radically different in-
terpretation from Art. XX(b) of the GATT 1994. Furthermore,
it was unable to identify any significant differences between the
tests that have been developed under Art. XX(b) of the GATT
1994 and Art. 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, or any aspect of the
Art. XX(b) jurisprudence relating to the interpretation of the
term ”necessary” that would be inapplicable to Art. 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement.2.
2Panel Report, US-Gasoline, para. 6.20 (cited in Panel Report, EC-
Asbestos, para. 8.169; Panel Report, EC-Tariff Preferences, para. 7.197; Panel
On the other hand, a comparison of the quantitative and
qualitative economic analyses that were undertaken in different
disputes requiring the same legal assessment tests, indicate oth-
erwise. WTO tribunals have been reluctant to embrace quantita-
tive economic practices in their decision-making, and rarely one
finds economic methodologies complementing the legal anal-
ysis in dispute settlements. Furthermore, in WTO DSB pro-
ceedings, it has been the parties, who undertake such analysis.
If parties include quantitative economic analysis in their argu-
ments, the panels/ABmay or may not find it useful or necessary
to their own analysis.
The DS cases surveyed in this paper indicate that the tri-
bunals often complement legal analysis by using purely basic
economic data or descriptive evidence. Such analysis is cer-
tainly neither exhaustive, nor able to provide a conclusive eval-
uation of the real cost (restrictiveness) of the specific measure
when imposed to achieving its desirable objective. Further-
more, it is insufficient to assess the trade restrictiveness of po-
tential alternative measures and other economic impacts in real-
izing the same goal. A broader prospective is required in order
Report, Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, para. 7.40.)
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to complement the legal analysis and for that economic analysis
could be useful. Since empirical evidence are rarely submitted
to the Panel or the ABs, this paper provides several suggestive
studies, which could shed light or add further insights to the
tribunals adjudications.
Over the past two decades, the imposition of technical and
regulatory policy measures is increasingly expending, especially
in light of the dramatically decline in the use of tariffs. Ev-
idence regarding the incidence NTMs demonstrates that tech-
nical barriers to trade (TBTs) are by far the most frequently
used NTM, with the average country imposing them on about
30 percent of products and trade. Sanitary or phyto-sanitary
(SPS) measures are imposed on average on about 15 percent of
trade (Nicita & Gourdon, 2012).
The economic theory regarding the trade effects of NTMs
implies that expansion of their use, lead to a decrease of domes-
tic demand, hence creates trade restrictiveness. Albeit, NTMs
may increase information and confidence provided to consumers,
as well as willingness to pay for these goods, consequently, af-
fect positively on the demand for imports. The empirical liter-
ature, however, reinforces the negative overall impact of NTMs
on imports. Kee et al. (2009) estimate that NTMs, in gen-
eral, add on average an additional 87% on the restrictiveness
imposed by tariffs. Moreover, the level of restrictiveness is sig-
nificantly higher for exports of developing countries to OECD
members (Disdier et al., 2008), particularly in food products,
which are typically subject to SPS.
Considering that WTO Panel/AB is expected to evaluate
whether a NTM is more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil
its objective a decisive and comparable level of trade restric-
tiveness is essential. Yet, measuring trade restrictiveness is a
difficult task to perform when regulatory or technical measures
are imposed. Unlike tariffs, for which the available quantitative
databases enable the evaluation of their effect on various eco-
nomic indicators; NTMs are more challenging to quantify, due
to their numerous forms; qualitative nature, insufficient public
available information and satisfactorily transparency. As a re-
sult, the complexity of measuring, in a quantitative systematic
manner, the impact of NTMs, remains a significant obstacle for
their inclusions in the tribunals consideration. Nevertheless, in
recent years, a significant advancement in both the theoretical
and empirical fields could relieve this averseness, allowing to
quantifying the impact of NTMs in various countries, sectors
and even the product level, while comparing to other less trade
restrictive alternative measures.
Several analytical approaches, which are well grounded on
economic theory, were introduced along the years, in order to
tackle this issue. Among them price-based techniques (i.e.,
price-wedge or econometric approach) and quantity-based meth-
ods. The price-wedge method approximates the degree to which
a specific regulatory or policy measure raises domestic prices
above international prices. Despite some conceptual and em-
pirical drawbacks, this method serves as a suitable proxy for
their restrictive impact.
The most predominant approach in the relevant economic
literature, which is present in few DS cases where quantitative
analysis is provided, is the quantity- based econometric method.
It allows observing how the presence of NTMs affects trade, by
employing statistical analysis of trade data. The approach uses
gravity models, factor-content models or models which com-
bine features of both in order to identify the trade effects of
a particular policy measure. An imperative requirement is a
reasonable period of time prior and after the measure has been
implemented (Ex-Post analysis). Results are often expressed as
tariff equivalents, and depend on the assumptions and specifi-
cations of the models.
Moreover, in recent years, built on quantity-based approach,
economic studies have developed novel quantitative tools, which
allow measuring the trade restrictiveness index (TRI) of NTMs,
at a very disaggregate level of HS classification. These instru-
ments, which take into account the presence of many NTMs,
provide estimations of the ad-valorem equivalents of these mea-
sures. The levels and changes over time, across different coun-
tries and products, may complement other more traditional or
less accurate techniques, which were insufficient for the pur-
pose of economic analysis in dispute settlements. An example
for a recent work of this kind is the study of Kee, Nicita and
Olarreaga (2009), which is based on the framework of the Trade
Restrictiveness Index (TRI) of Anderson and Neary (1992 and
1994).
Lastly, the simulation methods, which have been long used
to modelling the effects of changes in tariffs on various macroe-
conomic variables, are recently implemented for NTMs. Such
simulations, which have a clearer explanation of causal fac-
tors, are designed as ex-ante analysis tools. They may apply
static models, which compare specific points in time, or dy-
namic models (evolution from initial to the final equilibrium).
Simulations are either based on General Equilibrium (GE) mod-
els, meaning linking several industries and countries, or Partial
Equilibrium models, which analyse specific defined products or
single markets.
In the paper, we survey the dispute settlement cases, where
some of the mentioned economic techniques were provided by
the disputing parties. These methodologies are presented along
with the reasoning given by the Panel/AB to the reluctance ap-
proach to adopt these analyses in their consideration. In ad-
dition, we establish that for almost each of these DS cases,
the economic literature can provide at least one study which
demonstrate how the impact of the chosen measure can be po-
tentially quantified econometrically. Consequently, these esti-
mations may serve in order to compare the measures impact
to possibly less trade restrictive alternative measures. The pa-
per highlights the valuable importance and the benefits of these
methodologies in complementing the existing resolutions of the
DSB.
2. GATT Article XX (b) and (d)
2.1 The necessity of a non-conforming measure
Non-compliant trade measures may be exempt fromGATT /
WTO rules, if justified under specific public interest conditions
set out in GATT Article XX on General Exceptions. The ex-
ception assessed in this paper is paragraphs (b) of Article XX.
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Pursuant to this paragraphs, WTO members may adopt policy
measures that are inconsistent with GATT disciplines, to pursue
legitimate non-trade objectives reasonably and in good faith.
These measures are deemed necessary to protect human, ani-
mal or plant life or health.
Clearly much hinges on the interpretation determining the
word necessity. The requirements of the necessity test, as con-
tained in paragraph (b) of Article XX of GATT 1994, have been
interpreted in several previous disputes.3 According to these
case laws, the necessity of a measure should be determined
through the analysis of a series of factors:
i The importance of the interests or values protected by the
challenged measure
ii The contribution of the measure to the realization of the
objectives pursued by it
iii The restrictive impact of the measure on international trade
Once these three factors have been assessed, an analysis of
possible alternatives to the challenged measure should be un-
dertaken and a process of weighing and balancing of the factors
and the alternatives should be carried out with the aim of deter-
mining whether the challenged measure is necessary.
The Panel in China-Raw Materials dispute highlighted that
a measure falling within Article XX(b) must be visibly intended
to achieve the objective perused - the protection of health. A
mere linkage is insufficient. The Panel found that Chinas export
restraints on energy-intensive, highly polluting, resource based
products (EPRs), could not be described as measures designed
to protect health. To accept the argument that the measure was
part of a general program of pollution reduction would mean
that Article XX(b) could be interpreted to allow the use of ex-
port restrictions on any polluting products on the ground that
export restrictions reduce the production of these products and
thus pollution.4
Elsewhere in China-Rare Earths dispute, China asserted
that a measure relates to conservation whenever the measure
”contributes” to the realization of aMember’s conservation goals.
A measure’s contribution to such goals might be demonstrated
through a showing of that measure’s aptness to contribute to
conservation, since the results of regulatory actions aimed at
conservation may not be immediately observable. The AB re-
jected this approach and maintained the Panels legal focus on
the design and structure of the export quotas in assessing whether
the measures relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources within the meaning of Article XX(g). Removing the
need for economics, the AB found that the Panel did not err in
stating that ”the analysis under subparagraph (g) does not re-
quire an evaluation of the actual effects of the concerned mea-
sures.
3Appellate Body Report Korea-Beef, para, 164; Appellate Body Report EC-
Asbestos, para. 172; Appellate Body Report US-Gambling, para. 306, and
Appellate Body Report Dominican Republic -Cigarettes, para. 70.
4Panel report, China-Raw Materials, para. 7.515.
2.2 Assessing the contribution of the measure
As regards factor b), the subject of this paper, the Appellate
Body Report in Brazil-Retreaded Tyres5 stated that a measure
can contribute to the stated objective in two different ways:
i it can bring about a material contribution to the achieve-
ment of its objective; or
ii it can be apt to produce a material contribution to the ob-
jective pursued, even if the contribution is not immediately
observable.
Thus, a panel may find that certain complex public health or
environmental problems can be tackled only with a comprehen-
sive policy comprising a multiplicity of interacting measures.
Yet there must be evidence that the measure can bring about a
material contribution to the Member’s stated objective. Indeed,
the AB went on to define a material contribution as one which
needs to contribute in a significant or non-marginal way to the
achievement of its objective. To assess the degree of neces-
sity of a measure in achieving its objective has also been found
to be: in a continuum, located significantly closer to the pole
of indispensable than to the opposite pole of simply making a
contribution to.6 A measure could be found to contribute to the
achievement of the objective ”when there is a genuine relation-
ship of ends and means between the objective pursued and the
measure at issue.”7
Adding to this relativist approach, the AB has also expressly
recognized that ”a risk may be evaluated either in quantita-
tive or qualitative terms” and that a Panel is under no obli-
gation to quantify the measures contribution to the objective
pursued. This was underlined in the Brazil-Retreaded Tyres
dispute, when the Appellate Body reported that a direct state-
ment was made to the effect that the contribution of the measure
could be demonstrated both quantitatively and/or qualitatively:
”Such a demonstration can of course be made by resort-
ing to evidence or data, pertaining to the past or the present,
that establish that the import ban at issue makes a material
contribution to the protection of public health or environmen-
tal objectives pursued. This is not, however, the only type of
demonstration that could establish such a contribution... ...[A]
demonstration could consist of quantitative projections in the
future, or qualitative reasoning based on a set of hypotheses
that are tested and supported by sufficient evidence.”8
Brazil defended its objective of reducing exposure to the
risks to human, animal, and plant life and health arising from
the accumulation of waste tyres under paragraph (b) of Article
XX of the GATT 1994. Stating that Brazil’s chosen level of
protection is the ”reduction of the risks of waste tyre accumula-
tion to the maximum extent possible”. The Panel then assessed
whether the import ban (i) can contribute to reduction in the
number of waste tyres generated in Brazil; and (ii) a reduction
in the number of waste tyres can contribute to the reduction
5Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, para. 151.
6Appellate Body Report,Korea-Beef,para.161.
7Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, para. 145.
8Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, para. 151.
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of the risks to human, animal, and plant life and health arising
from waste tyres. The Panel examined the replacement of im-
ported retreaded tyres with new tyres on Brazil’s market and
determined that all types of retreaded tyres have by definition
a shorter lifespan than new tyres. Accordingly, ”an import ban
on retreaded tyres may lead to a reduction in the total number
of waste tyres because imported verified the link between the
replacement of imported retreaded tyres with domestically re-
treaded tyres and a reduction in the number of waste tyres in
Brazil. If retreaded tyres are manufactured in Brazil from tyres
used in Brazil, the retreading of these used tyres contributes
to the reduction of the accumulation of waste tyres in Brazil
by ”giving a second life to some used tyres, which otherwise
would have become waste immediately after their first and only
life.”
The Panel chose to conduct a qualitative analysis of the con-
tribution of the Import Ban to the achievement of its objective,
which was within the bounds of the latitude it enjoys in choos-
ing a methodology for the analysis of the contribution. In the
course of its reasoning, the Panel tested some key hypotheses,
including that:
• imported retreaded tyres are replaced with new tyres and
domestically retreaded tyres
• some proportion of domestic used tyres are retreadable
and are being retreaded
• Brazil introduced a number of measures to facilitate the
access of domestic retreaders to good-quality used tyres
• more automotive inspections in Brazil lead to an increase
in the number of retreadable used tyres
• Brazil has the production capacity to retread such tyres
The Panel concluded that the prohibition on the importation
of retreaded tyres is capable of making a contribution to the ob-
jective pursued by Brazil, in that it can lead to a reduction in the
overall number of waste tyres generated in Brazil, which in turn
can reduce the potential for exposure to the specific risks to hu-
man, animal, plant life and health that Brazil seeks to address.
The Panel also agreed that Brazil has taken a series of measures
to facilitate the access of domestic retreaders to good- quality
used tyres, and that new tyres sold in Brazil are high-quality
tyres that comply with international standards and have the po-
tential to be retreaded.
Bown and Trachtman (2009), criticize the WTO jurispru-
dence in the Brazil-Retreaded Tyres dispute, for its failure to
evaluate the types of concerns that an economic welfare analy-
sis would provide. The Panel should have estimated, in quanti-
tative terms, the reduction of waste tyres that would result from
the Import Ban, or the time horizon of such a reduction. With-
out examining any empirical data, nor estimations on magni-
tudes, on the contribution of the import ban to the objective
perused, it is impossible to make a rational judgment of the
utility of the Brazilian policies contested. They suggest that
if the justification for the import ban was grounded on the ar-
gument that it was a second-best Brazilian policy designed to
combat a large externality, then Brazils failure to impose a ban
on used-tyre imports weakens its effectiveness by eroding po-
tential welfare gains through a reduction in equilibrium produc-
tion (and consumption) of Brazilian retreaded tyres. Moreover,
the MERCOSURs exemption from the ban has the same impact
as weakening the possible environmental externality benefit of
the import ban.
Returning to the reasoning in the China-Raw Materials dis-
pute, the export restrictions on various raw materials were de-
fended under Article XX(b) as intended to make a material con-
tribution to reduce health risks associated with pollution gener-
ated by the production of specific raw materials. The economic
rationale put forward was that under normal economic condi-
tions, export restrictions would reduce the demand for exports,
which decreases domestic production and, in turn, the pollution
associated with its production. Furthermore, China argued that,
in the long term, high world market prices would provide an
incentive to new producers to enter the market, consequently
reduce the world prices to their initial level. China submitted
supporting evidence using both regression analyses and simu-
lation models. The Panel found that the fact that in the long
run the trade-restrictive effects of a measure may vanish does
not imply that the short-term costs associated with the measure
are not highly restrictive. The Panel upheld the claimants chal-
lenge that the health- friendly description of the export duties
was a mere ex-post facto rationalization of measures that were
not originally designed to protect health.
The Panel found that Chinas quantitative analysis was prob-
lematic on the various grounds: Firstly, the highly speculative
estimations, and lack of adequate data used in the economic
analysis. Secondly, the inaccurate specifications of the esti-
mated regression models such as control variables, as consump-
tion and production, which are affected by the very export re-
strictions being examined. The most significant criticism was
also directed at the unreasonable resemblance between domes-
tic supply and demand elasticities for all EPR products. China
had failed to establish that production technologies for the raw
materials and the degree with which firms in the downstream
sector can substitute these raw materials with other inputs, sim-
ilarly across products. For that, the Panel found the analysis
insufficient to account for critical upstream-downstream inter-
actions. The latter is particularly important since the impact of
Chinas export restrictions on domestic prices is affected by Chi-
nas dominant role as an exporter of raw materials. As Chinas
prices have been consistently lower than the international prices
over the years, preserving this gap clearly offers an advantage
to the domestic downstream manufacturing sectors over foreign
producers.
China also built on past empirical evidence that corresponds
with the ”Environmental Kuznets Curve” (EKC) theory, which
suggests that as economic development takes place, environ-
mental degradation increases until a certain point, and then de-
creases with the rise in GDP per capita. The Panel stated that
even assuming that export restrictions could help generate the
required discovery externalities and growth in the metal indus-
tries, it cannot prove a causal linkage from economic growth
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to environmental quality9. Particularly it does not necessarily
mean that imposition of export restrictions on EPR products
will be translated into long-term economic growth, which in
turn achieves environmental protection. The Panel concluded
that the evidence submitted did not prove that the export restric-
tions made a material contribution to the protection of health.
Regarding possible future contribution of the policy objective,
the Panel disagreed that these measures could increase national
growth and welfare, and consequently raise the level of health
protection. Subsequently, the Panel went on arguendo, to prove
that in any event the measures could not pass the least-trade
restrictive means test.
Charlier & Guillou (2014), examined the effects of an ex-
port quota on quantities, prices and price distortion, based on
the China-Raw Materials dispute, using a model of a monopoly
extracting a non-renewable resource and selling it on both the
domestic and foreign markets. The empirical results highlight
the importance of demand elasticities, for each heterogenic prod-
uct, as suggested by the Panel in the dispute. It provides estima-
tions of import demand elasticity for each product concerned
in the case (at the HS6 level). Moreover, they challenge the
proposition that an export quota always favours conservation
of natural resource, and that a higher foreign price necessar-
ily follows this policy and inherently increases price distortion
and therefore discrimination. Among the products concerned,
two groups should be differentiated depending on Chinas ex-
port market power. When China is a significant exporter, there
is no evident sign of the distortionary effect by the export quota.
However, as a weak exporter, but a strong producer and con-
sumer, there is evidence according to which China is imposing
an inefficient.
Despite several differences, driven by the characteristics of
the two dispute cases, and the quantitative evidence provided,
the Panel has reached relatively similar conclusions in China-
Rare Earths dispute. China justified export duties that violated
Paragraph 11.3 of Chinas Accession Protocol to the WTO, by
alleging that these duties were justifiable under the scope of
Article XX(b).10 While the Panel admitted that it was provided
with sufficient evidence to substantiate that the mining and pro-
duction of rare earths caused grave harm to the environment,
health of humans, animals and plants in China, it was not con-
vinced by Chinas quantitative or qualitative arguments. Partic-
ularly, China failed to prove that the export duties were specif-
ically designed to reduce the environmental pollution; make a
material contribution to achieve pollution reduction; establish
causality linkage between the duties and the objective perused;
relate the actual environmental impacts of the export duties on
rare earths with that of reasonably available measures.
Chinas arguments were supported by prof. Jaime de Me-
los economic report ”Selected Economic Issues Regarding Ex-
port Quotas and Production Quotas”.11 These claims were con-
fronted with an economic analysis of Prof. L. Alan Winters.12
9Panel Report, China-Raw Materials, para. 7.551-7.553.
10Panel Report, China-Rare Earths, para. 7.172.
11Panel Exhibit CHN-157
12Panel Exhibit JE-169
Both economic experts agreed that a binding production quota
introduced in isolation is likely to reduce both exports and do-
mestic consumption relative to the unrestricted trade situation,
as both export and domestic prices would be driven up. How-
ever, the experts disagreed on the nature of the interaction be-
tween production quotas and export quotas that would be neces-
sary to ensure that no ”perverse signals” are sent by the export
quotas.
The Panel rejected Chinas arguments while expressing con-
cerns regarding the reliability of the data and methodology with
respect to the gap between foreign and domestic prices, and
found the position of the complainants more convincing, based
on a supportive analysis by Prof. Grossman.13 According to
this, a tax levied on exports causes an increase in foreign mar-
kets prices, and a fall in price in the home market. The increase
in domestic consumption would offset the fall in foreign con-
sumption. The Panel concluded that the fall in Chinas foreign
exports of rare earths would indeed be offset by the increase in
domestic consumption of rare earths as to negate any possible
pollution reduction effects of the challenged measures.14 In the
case above, the Panel was expected to determine which particu-
lar economic evidence and methodologies are more reliable and
should therefore be trusted. In turn, this reaffirms the imperative
role of a well-grounded quantitative analysis in complementing
the legal arguments, in similar future disputes.
2.3 Assessing less trade restrictive alternative measures
If the preliminary analysis under Article XX(b) and (d) on
the contribution of the measure to the objective pursued yields
an initial conclusion that the measure is necessary, the result
must be confirmed by comparing the challenged measure with
possible alternatives suggested by the complainants.15 Further,
that in order to qualify as an alternative, a measure must be not
only less trade restrictive than the challenged policy measure,
but should also preserve for the responding Member its right to
achieve its desired level of protection with respect to the objec-
tive pursued.16
The mere existence of an alternative measure is not suf-
ficient to prove that the disputed measure is not ”necessary”.
Citing US-Gasoline,17 the Appellate Body in Brazil-Retreaded
Tyres confirmed that a proposed alternative must preserve a
Members right to achieve its desired level of protection with re-
spect to the objective pursued”. If the respondent demonstrates
that the measure proposed is not a genuine alternative, or is not
reasonably available, the measure at issue is to be deemed nec-
essary.18 Moreover, such alternative cannot be ”merely theo-
13Panel Exhibit JE-164. ”Export Duties as a Means to Address Environmen-
tal Externalities”
14Panel Report, China-Rare Earths, para. 7.178.
15The AB Reports for several disputes have confirmed that it rests upon the
complaining Member to identify possible alternatives: US-Gambling; Brazil-
Retreaded Tyres; China-Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment
Products;
16Appellate Body Reports: US-Gambling, para. 309 and Brazil-Retreaded
Tyres, para. 156.
17Appellate Body Report, US-Gambling, para. 308.
18Appellate Body Reports: Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, para. 156; US-
Gambling, para. 307; Korea-Beef, para. 166.
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retical in nature, for instance, where the responding Member is
not capable of taking it, or where the measure imposes an undue
burden on that Member, such as prohibitive costs or substantial
technical difficulties.”19
In Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, the EU suggested two possible
alternative measures or practices: (1) measures to reduce the
number of waste tyres accumulating in Brazil; (2) measures or
practices to improve the domestic management of waste tyres.
The Panel rejected them as reasonably available alternatives to
the Import Ban since: the proposed alternatives were already
in place and have not achieved Brazils chosen level of pro-
tection, or would carry their own risks and hazards. Yet, cer-
tain estimates would have been very useful and, undoubtedly,
would have strengthened the foundation of the Panels findings.
Bown and Trachtman (2009) argue, however, that the Panel/AB
reached their conclusions using unsatisfactorily statements, rather
than pursuing the best available evidence. The WTO thus ig-
nored its mandate of identifying the existence of less treaty in-
consistent or trade restrictive alternatives that would contribute
equivalently to the achievement of the relevant goal.
Furthermore, in their welfare-economic analysis, Bown &
Trachtman suggest examining the effects of two possible al-
ternative measures. The first-best policy measure involves a
production subsidy on retreads of once-used Brazilian tyres,
equal to the size of the environmental externality, which Brazil
aims to correct. Such measure incentivizes retreading addi-
tional tyres that would not otherwise have been retreaded. The
reason for that is the relatively low prices received by produc-
ers, as the market was not compensating them for the external
societal benefit associated with retreading. Their model indi-
cates that though consumers do not benefit a change in price,
and the level of imports decreases, domestic producers will in-
crease their manufacturing to the socially optimal level. More-
over, such measure is anticipated to contribute positively to
Brazils total welfare. The second-best policy measure, was
levying a tariff on imports of retreads. Similarly to the pre-
vious proposed measure, domestic producers are encouraged to
retread more of the stock of once-used Brazilian tyres. Yet,
consumers face a higher price, and consequently reduce their
imports even more compared to the production subsidy. The au-
thors suggest that such trade policy can be welfare improving to
Brazil, when the externality gains are large and the by-product
(consumption) distortion losses associated with the import tariff
are small.
Both of the alternative policies are less restrictive than a full
ban, and capable of achieving Brazils goal to the same extent as
an import ban. However, each may raise questions regarding
their reasonable availability. A production subsidy may poten-
tially discriminate or impose a restriction on imported tyres,
which violate Articles III and IX of GATT (respectively). More-
over, such measures may involve a establishing a costly and
often too administratively complex tax collection scheme that
would later provide the exact production subsidy. An addi-
tional difficulty, involves verifying that the once-used tyres be-
ing retreaded, which entitle to receive subsidy, was consumed
19Appellate Body Report, US-Gambling, para. 308.
in Brazil and not elsewhere while later imported to Brazil. Nev-
ertheless, this economic analysis provides a theoretical frame-
work, assessing potential alternative measures employed in sim-
ilar disputes.
In the EC-Asbestos dispute, Canada argued that the De-
cree was an excessive measure in view of the fact that con-
trolled use is a less trade-restrictive alternative that enables the
French objective of protecting human health to be attained. Nei-
ther the preamble to the TBT Agreement nor the precautionary
principle can justify the measure taken by the French Govern-
ment in breach of the obligations contained in the TBT Agree-
ment. Moreover, Canada claimed that Frances risk assessment
is based on hypothetical data and therefore has no real factual
relation to the situation actually prevailing in France, while of-
ten misleadingly to base it on data from exposure to amphiboles
or mixed fibres, instead of to chrysotile fibres alone. The ex-
trapolations from data based on high exposure levels and expo-
sures to friable products greatly exaggerates the risk from low
exposure levels to products where chrysotile is encapsulated in
a hard matrix, specifically chrysotile-cement and friction prod-
ucts. The analysis of reasonably available alternatives included
the question of whether controlled use of asbestos:
• Is sufficiently effective in the light of France’s health pol-
icy objectives and
• Constitutes a reasonably available measure
The Panel considered that the evidence tends to show that
handling chrysotile- cement products constitutes a risk to health
rather than the opposite. Accordingly, a decision-maker respon-
sible for taking public health measures might reasonably con-
clude that the presence of chrysotile-cement products posed a
risk because of the risks involved in working with those prod-
ucts. Accordingly, the Panel concluded that the EC has made a
prima facie case for the existence of a health risk in connection
with the use of chrysotile, in particular as regards lung cancer.
Furthermore, it was noted that the levels of protection obtained
by following international standards, whether it be the ISO stan-
dard or the WHO Convention, are lower than those established
by France, including those applicable before the introduction
of the Decree. Considering the high level of risk identified,
France’s objective, which the Panel could not question, justified
the adoption of exposure ceilings lower than those for which the
international conventions provided. The AB report therefore
found that controlled use is not a reasonably available alterna-
tive in all the other sectors in which workers may be exposed to
chrysotile.
In the case of China-Raw Materials, the Panel acknowl-
edged that the measures in place (export restrictions) are less re-
strictive in most of the EPR products than full ”bans” would be.
However, the Panel rejected China’s claims that the policy mea-
sures are not restrictive, since the effect of an export restrictions
on the world market does not depend on the world availability
of the raw natural resources needed to manufacture EPR prod-
ucts, but on a country’s export market share in the EPR market.
Economic evidence proves that China’s share of global exports
in some of these products is significant, hence even unassertive
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measures would have a substantial impact. The complainants
suggested six available WTO-consistent less trade-restrictive
alternative measures that could ensure reduction of pollution
and protection of health. The Panel agreed to undertake an ar-
guendo analysis of the measures, which consist: (i) investment
in more environmentally friendly technologies; (ii) further en-
couragement and promotion of recycling of consumer goods;
(iii) increasing environmental standards; (iv) investing in ”in-
frastructure necessary to facilitate recycling scrap”; (v) stimu-
lating greater local demand for scrap material without discour-
aging local supply; and (vi) introducing production restrictions
or pollution controls on primary production.
China responded that these suggested measures are already
in place in China, and export restrictions complement them in
order to achieve a better environmental protection. The Panel
stated that China has not been able to provide evidence that
these measures are actually implemented, while simply show-
ing guidelines or plans cannot substitute mandatory obligations.
Secondly, China did not justify why the proposed alternatives,
could not be sufficient to achieve the objective stated or stand
alone without additional export restrictions.20 Based on the ex-
amination of the three factors determining whether the mea-
sures were necessary and the assessment of less trade restrictive
alternative measures, the Panel found that Chinas claims for us-
ing the export restrictions were not sufficiently justified. China
did not to appeal the Panels decisions under Article XX(b).
3. SPS Article 5.6
3.1 The scope of Article 5.6
Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement provides that:
[W]hen establishing or maintaining sanitary or phytosanitary
measures to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary or phy-
tosanitary protection, Members shall ensure that such measures
are not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their ad-
equate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking into
account technical and economic feasibility.
The footnote to this provision reads as follows:
For purpose of paragraph 6 of Article 5, a measure is not more
trade-restrictive than required unless there is another measure,
reasonably available taking into account technical and eco-
nomic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level of sanitary
or phytosanitary less restrictive to trade.
Article 5.6 adopts a least trade restrictive alternatives test
which, like the same test under Article XX(b) of the GATT,
the less trade restrictive alternatives are regarded as reason-
ably available only when they are economically feasible and
can accomplish the same levels of protection which the mea-
sures invoked by defending parties can achieve. Marceau and
Trachtman .2009), however, identify a significant difference,
which unlike the assessment of necessity under Article XX of
20Panel Report, China-Raw Materials, para. 7.590
the GATT, the evaluation under Article 5.6 of the SPS Agree-
ment does not include consideration of the degree of the mea-
sures contribution to the end pursued.
In Australia-Salmon and Japan-Apples, the AB found that
all of the following three factors have to be shown in order to
establish a violation of Article 5.6:
1. There is at least one alternative, which is reasonably avail-
able, taking into account technical and economic feasi-
bility;
2. The alternatives can achieve the Member’s appropriate
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection;
3. The alternative is significantly less restrictive to trade
than the SPS measure in dispute.
In Australia-Salmon, the AB affirmed that determining the
appropriate level of protection is the right of the Member con-
cerned, and not of the WTO tribunals. However, determining
the level of protection should be done before adopting the mea-
sure, with sufficient precision. Otherwise, the Panel may deter-
mine its level of protection on the basis of the measure itself. In
this dispute, Australia expressed its level of protection as very
conservative, but the Panel instead assessed it as zero- risk on
the basis that the measure itself was a total ban. Moreover,
since Article 5.6 ignores balancing the contribution to a legiti-
mate objective, the tribunal need not reject the use of a measure
merely because it did not adequately contribute to its objective
and is highly trade restrictive. In the absence of a reasonably
available alternative, a measure will be considered as consis-
tent with the provision.
Additionally, in Article 5.6 (as in TBT Article 2.2) the com-
plainant must raise a prima facie case that the measure infringes
them before the burden switches to the respondent to provide a
rebuttal. Under the general exceptions, the complainant only
needs to propose a measure to activate the respondents burden
of proving that it is not reasonably available. As the subject
matter of the SPS Agreement typically applies to measures de-
signed to achieve protection of health, the complainants burden
will often require it to prove detailed technical matters demon-
strating that its proposed alternative would achieve the respon-
dents level of protection.
3.2 Assessing trade restrictiveness of measure and possible
alternatives
In Australia-Salmon, the contested measure imposed by Aus-
tralia (certain heat treatment requirements) prohibits the im-
portation of fresh, chilled or frozen salmon. The Panel stated
that the possible alternatives, which would be compared with
the import ban of the raw salmon concerned, were five mea-
sures, identified, in the Australian 1996 Final Report. Whereas,
Canada noted four alternative options are significantly less trade
restrictive, Australia argued that the feasibility of one measure
may be reliant on the existence of another, therefore individual
measures or sets of measures are not technically and economi-
cally feasible in practice.21 Moreover, some of the options were
21Panel Report, Australia-Salmon, para. 4.276.
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clearly less trade-restrictive than the import ban/heat treatment
requirement. While. the Panel found that less trade-restrictive
measures existed, and could have been used by Australia,22 the
AB reversed the ruling on grounds that the Panel did not eval-
uate or assess the alternative measures relative effectiveness in
reducing the overall disease risk. Furthermore, it had based its
considerations on the heat-treatment requirement, and not on
the import prohibition. Yet because of these insufficient fac-
tual findings, the AB found itself unable to conclude whether
Australia had violated Article 5.6.
In Australia-apples, the Panel stated that the reasoning ar-
ticulated in Australia’s risk assessment, with respect to the like-
lihood of entry, establishment and spread of fire blight, includ-
ing estimation of the value for the respective probabilities, does
not rely on adequate scientific evidence and, accordingly, not
coherent and objective. The Panel agreed with New Zealands
assertions that the methodological flaws result in a situation
where the risk assessment overestimates the overall probabil-
ity of the entry, establishment and spread of fire blight in this
dispute. Moreover, the importation of mature, symptomless ap-
ples, suggested by New Zealand, was an appropriate alternative
for Australia’s eight fire blight and four European canker mea-
sures, and that the inspection of a 600-unit sample from each
import lot was an appropriate alternative for Australia’s ALCM
measure.
In its appeal, Australias submitted a Final Import Risk Anal-
ysis Report for Apples from New Zealand (”IRA”). This risk
assessment was ”semi-quantitative” in that, for each pest, it
combined a quantitative assessment of the likelihood of en-
try, establishment and spread with a qualitative assessment of
the likely associated potential biological and economic con-
sequences. The combination of these probability assessments
then yield an overall determination of ”unrestricted risk”, that
is, the risk associated with the importation of apples from New
Zealand in the absence of any risk management measures. The
IRA report, responded to New- Zealands claims regarding the
imposing SPS measures in the Australia-Apples case, although
it did not allow a genuine assessment of the restrictiveness of
the measure, or possible alternatives. Nevertheless, the AB
reversed the Panel’s findings of inconsistency in regard to the
measures relating to these two pests.
An economic analysis which was undertaken by Yue and
Beghin (2009) reaffirms New Zealands claims. It estimates the
tariff equivalent and trade effects when there is no trade flow
of a commodity due to the presence of a quarantine non-tariff
measure (i.e. imports ban). Their solution yields demand func-
tions influenced by prices (include transportation costs, tariffs
and the tariff equivalent of the technical barriers) and a ran-
dom component. This yields likelihood functions of consump-
tion levels of the commodity in the countries involved and other
countries that depend on prices in those countries. Their appli-
cation suggests that the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of the ban
by Australia on New-Zealnad apples is, on average, about 99%
of the fob price inclusive of transportation costs.
22Panel Report, Australia-Salmon, para. 7.146.
In Japan-Apples, the Least Trade Restrictive Alternative anal-
ysis under Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement was seen to have
been a relatively moderate one, as compared with that of Arti-
cle XX (b) of the GATT. In this dispute, the Japanese varietal
testing requirement was compared with ”testing by product”, as
a less trade restrictive alternative. The Panel found that Japan
acted inconsistently with Article. 5.6 since the measure was
more trade-restrictive than required to achieve the appropriate
level of SPS protection. It concluded that this alternative mea-
sure: (i) was reasonably available taking into account technical
and economic feasibility; (ii) achieved Japan’s appropriate level
of SPS protection; and (iii) was significantly less restrictive to
trade than the SPS measure at issue, confirming the 3-pronged
test.
The Panels ruling is reinforced by an econometric analy-
sis of Calvin & Krissoff (1998), who quantify the restrictive-
ness of the SPS measures that Japan imposed on apple imports
from the US. They measured the trade and welfare impacts of
reducing trade barriers, building on a partial equilibrium (PE),
two-equation framework that endogenously determines the SPS
tariff-rate equivalent and the level of trade. Their estimates of
ad-valorem equivalent of the Japanese technical measures, us-
ing the price wedge approach, are around 27%, hence signif-
icantly more critical than tariffs in restricting imports. They
suggest that these measures serve mainly as a protectionist in-
strument for shielding domestic producers of Fuji apples.
The Panels ruling is reinforced by an econometric analy-
sis of Calvin & Krissoff (1998), who quantify the restrictive-
ness of the SPS measures that Japan imposed on apple imports
from the US. They measured the trade and welfare impacts of
reducing trade barriers, building on a partial equilibrium (PE),
two-equation framework that endogenously determines the SPS
tariff-rate equivalent and the level of trade. Their estimates of
ad-valorem equivalent of the Japanese technical measures, us-
ing the price wedge approach, are around 27%, hence signif-
icantly more critical than tariffs in restricting imports. They
suggest that these measures serve mainly as a protectionist in-
strument for shielding domestic producers of Fuji apples.
In a follow-up analysis, Calvin et al .(2007) indicate the
economic costs of Japans SPS measures on US apples. They
estimate the transaction cost (k = 33) and SPS measures (CPP
= 15) at cents per pounds. Using these results and the ex-
porters price (Pus = 50), the tariff equivalent of SPS is esti-
mated to be approximately 18.1%. Honda (2012) uses similar
methodology to that suggested by Yue and Beghin (2009) on
Australia, and suggests that Japans SPS measures impose a sig-
nificantly higher restrictiveness on U.S. apples, which has an
average effect over the entire period of 118.9%. These results
imply that other suggested methodologies for quantifying tariff
equivalents of Japanese SPS on U.S. apple imports have been
underestimated.
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4. TBT Article 2.2
4.1 Application of technical regulations under Article 2.2
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement establishes:
”Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not pre-
pared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect
of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For
this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, tak-
ing account of the risks non-fulfilment would create. Such le-
gitimate objectives are, inter alia: national security require-
ments; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of hu-
man health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the en-
vironment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of consid-
eration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical infor-
mation, related processing technology or intended end-uses of
products.”
The resemblance in much of the wordings to GATT general ex-
ceptions has resulted in Appellate Body jurisprudence on TBT
Article 2.2 being closely aligned with Article XX(b). When
determining if the challenged measure is more trade-restrictive
than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective under Article 2.2,
the AB has established a test very similar to the necessity test
under the general exceptions. First, the Panel is required to
weigh and balance the trade-restrictiveness of the regulation
with its contribution to the legitimate objective, and the risks
that non-fulfilment creates.23 Second, if the measure is found
necessary, the Panel will consider whether there are any rea-
sonably available less-trade restrictive alternatives, which could
make an equally contribution to the objective24 Accordingly,
the Panel should take account of the nature of the risks at is-
sue and the gravity of the consequences that would arise from
non-fulfilment25.
The main differences between the two provisions are the
following: First, the burden of proof to establish the violation
of Article 2.2 of the TBT agreement lies with the complainant.
This in in contrast to GATT Article XX, where the respondent
bears the burden of establishing the justification for what else
would be a violation.26 Secondly, while Article 2.2 contains a
non-exhaustive list of the legitimate objectives, the general ex-
ceptions contain only the base on which an exception can be
established27; Thirdly, it is only in Article 2.2, that the risks of
non-fulfilment of the relevant objective is required to be con-
sidered in determining whether a TBT measure is more trade-
restrictive than necessary.
4.2 Assessment of trade restrictiveness of a measure
23Appellate Body Report, USTuna II (Mexico), [318]. See also Appellate
Body Reports, USCOOL, [374].
24Appellate Body Report, USTuna II (Mexico), [320]. See also Appellate
Body Reports, USCOOL, [376].
25Appellate Body Report, USTuna II (Mexico), [321].
26Appellate Body Reports, ECSeal Products, [5.169]; Appellate Body Re-
port, KoreaBeef, [157];
27Appellate Body Report, USTuna II (Mexico), [313]; Appellate Body Re-
port, USCOOL, [370].
In the US-Clove Cigarettes, the Panel found a solid ba-
sis for justifying the imposition of the measure, as it makes a
material contribution to the identified objective. This finding
was supported by numerous of scientific and quantitative evi-
dence, which were submitted by the respondent party.28 Sub-
sequently, the Panel decided to compare the measure with sev-
eral less restrictive alternatives measures, suggested by Indone-
sia. Among these measures were: adopting provisions to limit
cigarette companies from engaging in practices targeting youth
and adopting various measures set out in the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control aimed at preventing cigarette
sales to minors.29 Yet the Panels assessment rested on pure le-
gal analysis, without complementary economic evidence on the
level of restrictiveness of the proposed measures, nor on their
success in achieving the objective perused. Based on this nar-
row legal focus, the Panel found that Indonesia failed to prove
that its proposed alternative measures could reduce the relevant
health risks to the same extent as the US measure.
In theUS-Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL), the
Panel ruled that the US did not meaningfully inform consumers
about the countries of origin with respect of meat products. It
asserted that the labels identifying multiple countries of ori-
gin could confuse or mislead, rather than inform, consumers.
Moreover, the Panel stated that the COOL implementation is
more trade restrictive than is necessary to fulfil its objective, and
therefore violates Article 2.2 of the TBT agreement. The Panel
indicated that the focus of an assessment of trade-restrictiveness
should be the impact on competitive opportunities:
[T]he scope of the term trade-restrictive is broad ... [and]
does not require the demonstration of any actual trade effects,
as the focus is on the competitive opportunities available to im-
ported products...30. [T]he COOL measure negatively affects
imported livestocks conditions of competition in the US market
in relation to domestic livestock by imposing higher segregation
costs on imported livestock.31
The term competitive opportunities is often used in con-
tradistinction to trade effects; emphasising the importance of
market access to potential imports. Nevertheless, the Panel de-
clared that the COOL measure had brought about actual neg-
ative trade effects on imported livestock as shown by a signif-
icant and negative impact on import shares and prices.32 The
US provided the Panel with an econometric study33, prepared
by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), focusing on im-
ports from the Canadian and Mexican fed and feeder cattle mar-
ket. The study indicates that the price gap between Canada and
USs livestock decreased subsequent the implementation of the
COOL. The estimators of the COOL measure on the import
ratio of Canadian livestock were found to be negatively corre-
lated, although not significantly far from zero. Furthermore, it
showed that the US economic recession is the primary cause for
28Panel Report, US Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.402-7.414
29Panel Report, US Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.420
30Panel Reports, USCOOL, para. 7.572.
31Panel Reports, USCOOL, para. 7.574.
32Panel Reports, USCOOL, para 7.759.
33Exhibits US-42 and 149
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the decline in Canada import shares. The Panel also reviewed
two econometric analyses, submitted by Canada, namely the In-
forma study34 and the Sumner Econometric Study. The informa
study focused on the how different types of compliance and
segregation costs, of the COOL measure, are allocated along
the supply chains. It showed that these costs depend on a large
number of variables, among them the production fragmenta-
tion, the stage of the supply chain, size of the firm, and oth-
ers. The compliance costs increase as livestock and meat move
downstream on the chain. The second analysis described an
economic model simulation of the US livestock sector to illus-
trate how the differential implementation costs of the COOL
measure are distributed amongmarket participants throughmar-
ket forces. It emphasised the readiness of economic operators
along the supply chain to pay for mixed origin beef and hog,
along a comparison of the behaviour of consumers, prior and
post the imposition of the COOL measure. The implementation
of the COOL requirements, leads to a reduction of the willing-
ness to pay by the operators along the supply chain for given
quantities of Canadian cattle and hogs.
The Panel stated that it could not genuinely assess, the reli-
ability and precision of the estimations in the studies proposed
by both sides. Yet, Canadas reports were sufficiently robust to
prove the causal impact of COOL in reducing competitive op-
portunities for Canadian exporters. It accepted that the segrega-
tion costs lead traders towards privileging US-origin livestock,
consequently create a negative and significant impact on Cana-
dian import shares and prices. The US challenged this two-
step approach, arguing that the Panel went beyond the scope of
Article 2.2, to make an intrusive and far-ranging judgment on
whether COOL is effective public policy. Instead it should have
focused only on whether COOL is more trade- restrictive than
necessary. Although upholding the Panels ruling with regards
the legitimacy of the measures objective, the AB found the Pan-
els had incorrectly decided that a measure could be consistent
with Article 2.2 only if it fulfilled its objective completely or
exceeded some minimum level of fulfilment. It has ignored its
own findings, which demonstrated that the COOLmeasure does
contribute, at least to some extent, to achieving its objective.
Although reversing the Panels finding that COOL is inconsis-
tent with Article 2.2, the AB was not able to determine whether
COOL is more trade-restrictive than necessary to meet the TBT
requirement that it be a legitimate objective. The AB did not
complete its analysis, since it lacked the necessary evidentiary
information. It should also be noted that with respect to the less
trade-restrictive alternative measures, the Panel never reached
the stage of comparing the COOL measure against less trade
restrictive alternative measures, since the COOLmeasure ”does
not fulfil the identified objective within the meaning of Article
2.2, as it fails to convey meaningful origin information to con-
sumers”, therefore violates Article 2.2 of the TBT agreement.
Pouliot & Sumner (2012) highlight that the relative sizes
of the impacts of COOL on quantities and prices depend sig-
nificantly on Canadas export supply elasticity. Given the con-
ditions on demand and supply in Canada, the export supply
34Exhibits CDA-64
of fed cattle should be less elastic than the export supply for
feeder cattle. Subsequently, the model predicts that a strong
effect of COOL on price in the fed cattle market, and strong
effect of COOL on import quantity ratios in the feeder cattle
market. The empirical results show statistically significant ef-
fects of COOL that are consistent with the expectations from
the theoretical model. In the fed cattle market, results show
a significant widening of the basis from COOL while smaller
and less significant effects on the ratio of imports to domestic
use. In the market for feeder cattle, they found less significant
results for the price, but significant reductions in the import ra-
tios. Overall, the implementation of COOL had a significant
differential effect on the cattle market in Canada versus the US
domestic cattle market.
Twine & Rude (2012) assert the impact of the COOL mea-
sure from a slightly different angel. The authors propose a
multi-market partial equilibrium model in order to simulate the
impact of several exogenous shocks, on the economic perfor-
mance of Canadian and US beef cattle industries. These in-
clude: feed price escalation, mandatory COOL requirements,
and economic recession. Their empirical results demonstrate
that the impacts on the US industry are relatively small com-
pared to those on the Canadian industry. Moreover, the COOL
measure and feed price escalation, account for the largest nega-
tive impact on the Canadian cattle industry. These simulations
reinforce the WTO tribunals findings with respect to the trade
restrictiveness of the COOL measure.
4.3 The contribution of the Tuna-Dolphin dispute
In many respects, theUS-Tuna II (Mexico) dispute is a unique
example. Firstly, this case was the first time, in nearly 200WTO
rulings, that the Panel found a violation under Article 2.2 of
the TBT agreement. More importantly, the dispute exemplifies
the difficulties faced by the DSM when disputes involve con-
tentious quantitative submissions in the form of existing qual-
itative studies. For after determining whether the US dolphin
safe provisions fulfilled a legitimate objective, the Panel was
also called upon to determine whether the contribution of pro-
visions to the US objective (of ensuring that consumers are not
misled about whether the tuna contained in tuna products was
caught in a manner that adversely affects dolphins) are more
trade- restrictive than necessary to fulfil such objective, taking
account of the risks non- fulfilment would create.35
Firstly, the only piece of evidence presented in these pro-
ceedings to ascertain what US consumers in fact understand the
terms ”dolphin-safe” to mean is an opinion poll submitted by
Mexico.36 This poll shows that 48 per cent of the 800 individ-
uals surveyed believe that ”dolphin safe” means that ”no dol-
phins were killed or injured” while 12 per cent believe that it
means that ”dolphins were not encircled and then released to
capture the tuna”. The Panel found that in light of the poll, it
is not clear that US consumers understand the term ”dolphin-
safe” to mean the same as what the US dolphin-safe provisions
35Mexico’s first written submission, para. 205.
36Exhibit MEX-64.
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define it to mean.37 The discrepancies between the meaning
of this term under the measures and consumer perceptions may
create confusion and undermine the ability of the measure to
effectively ensure that consumers are not misled.
The Panel noted the numerous studies that suggest various
adverse impacts can arise from setting on dolphins, beyond ob-
served mortalities,38 but also other studies that question these
conclusions. The Panel stated that further study would be re-
quired in order to draw overall conclusions, confirming that the
information available in this respect is incomplete and that this
issue warrants additional analysis.39
“Our findings take into account the information, including
scientific information concerning the effects of tuna fishing on
dolphins that is available to us for the purposes of these pro-
ceedings. From these elements, it appears that a number of
aspects of this issue are not fully documented and that further
research may be necessary in order to ascertain the exact situ-
ation in various areas.”40
Ultimately, the AB reversed these Panel findings, , disagree-
ing that the measure at issue was more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfil US legitimate objectives, thus inconsistent
with Article 2.2. Instead, the AB determined that the alternative
measure proposed by Mexico (AIDCP dolphin safe labelling
combined with the existing US standard) would contribute to
both the consumer information objective and the dolphin pro-
tection objective, to a lesser degree than the measure at issue.
Mexicos failure to justify its arguments in front of the AB,
was likely due to its lack of ability to provide any quantita-
tive evidence to support its claims. Simply stating a hypotheti-
cal less trade restrictive alternative, without providing empirical
support that it is reasonably available, or that it is less trade re-
strictive, was insufficient. Taking the complementary approach
using an econometric analysis may have been found to be more
beneficiary to support Mexicos argument. Such an analysis
should have focus on the adverse effects of the labelling mea-
sure along with the US standard on the behaviour of consumers,
and eventually proving that it could achieve a similar level of
consumer information and dolphin protection as USs stated ob-
jective.
5. Conclusion
This paper has provided a comparison of the legal and eco-
nomic assessments used in GATT Article XX(b), Article 5.6 of
the SPS Agreement and Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. Par-
ticularly, it displays the selection of methodologies which were
undertaken in various dispute settlements, to analyse the neces-
sity of the selected measure at achieving the objective/ perused,
evaluate the trade restrictiveness which the policy measure im-
poses, as well as assess the availability of alternative less trade
restrictive policy measures. Since despite the substantial impor-
tance and centrality of the term trade-restrictiveness in DSM,
37United States’ response to Panel question No. 42, paras. 108-09.
38Exhibit US-4, p. 24.
39Exhibit MEX-67, p. 9.
40Panel report, US-Tuna II (Mexico): Para 7.623.
its definition and exact scope still remain unclear, we aim to
identify the arsenal of practices that the WTO tribunals use in
determining its meaning and justified extent.
The main conclusions are as follows: Firstly, despite mi-
nor differences, in general, the legal assessments are noticeably
similar. The same cannot be said regarding the application of
quantitative assessments of the various measures, which fall un-
der these provisions. Secondly, rarely any of the parties in the
disputes support their arguments using empirical modelling and
quantification of the trade restrictiveness of the chosen mea-
sures, nor a quantitative comparison to less trade restrictive al-
ternative measures. Thirdly, in the few cases where the parties
do provide such evidence, it is often rejected by the tribunal,
which explicitly express its concerns and lack of trust in these
methodologies. Much of this reluctance is explained on the
grounds of the reliability and accuracy of the data, the speci-
fications and control variables included the regressions or the
robustness of the findings. These justifications may explain the
tribunals rulings, however, the insufficient trust or lack of ac-
quaintance with the recent economic progress, still remain at
the heart of the underuse of economic assessments by the par-
ties themselves.
Lastly, the significant advancements in international trade
theory as well as in analytical methodologies assessing the trade
restrictiveness of policies, is of great benefit to WTO tribunals.
It may reduce uncertainty and promote a more consistent ap-
proach regarding assessments required in GATT/WTO trade dis-
putes. In the paper we provide various examples of studies from
the economic literature, which are directly related to the partic-
ular DS cases mentioned, and highlight the benefits of imple-
menting quantitative methodologies. Such valuable experience
in quantifying the extent to which a given policy measure or
alternative measure would contribute to a given non-trade pol-
icy objective, may provide coherent guidelines to on-going and
possibly future WTO disputes. Moreover, unless the Panel/AB
are prepared to assess the key conceptual economic approach
in their proceedings, they may potentially risk resulting in eco-
nomic outcomes that ultimately undermine the original objec-
tives of the WTO agreements.
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